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Abstract
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are one of the
key foundations of smart grids. The Distributed Network Protocol version
3 (DNP3) is a standard SCADA protocol designed to facilitate communi-
cations in substations and smart grid nodes. The protocol is embedded
with a security mechanism called Secure Authentication (DNP3-SA). This
mechanism ensures that end-to-end communication security is provided in
substations. This paper presents a formal model for the behavioural analysis
of DNP3-SA using Coloured Petri Nets (CPN). Our DNP3-SA CPN model
is capable of testing and verifying various attack scenarios: modification, re-
play and spoofing, combined complex attack and mitigation strategies. Using
the model has revealed a previously unidentified flaw in the DNP3-SA pro-
tocol that can be exploited by an attacker that has access to the network
interconnecting DNP3 devices. An attacker can launch a successful attack
on an outstation without possessing the pre-shared keys by replaying a pre-
viously authenticated command with arbitrary parameters. We propose an
update to the DNP3-SA protocol that removes the flaw and prevents such
attacks. The update is validated and verified using our CPN model proving
the effectiveness of the model and importance of the formal protocol analysis.
Keywords: Smart Grid, SCADA, DNP3, DNP3-SA, Formal Methods, CPN
1. Introduction
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are one of
the key foundations of smart grids. Recent literature (Ancillotti et al., 2013;
Lu et al., 2013; Yan et al., 2013; Gungor et al., 2013) shows that evolving
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smart grids are revolutionising the energy industry and enabling the elec-
tricity network to be more reliable and economical. A disruption, either
minor or major, deliberately or mistakenly caused to these infrastructures
can lead to damaging highly sophisticated devices, inflicting substantial eco-
nomic loses and posing as life-threatening situations. From the security per-
spective, legacy SCADA systems have long-lived under obscurity; as a result,
they have proven to be insecure to recent cyber attacks1 (Nicholson et al.,
2012; Miller and Rowe, 2012). For instance, had it not been for the stuxnet
attack discovered in 2010 (Langner, 2011), which created awareness, SCADA
security would have still lived in obscurity. Disrupting functionality in criti-
cal infrastructures is a very important issue to consider. Unfortunately, this
situation has now become the target area for many malicious attackers. For
example, in 2013 intruders managed to shut down a key tunnel road (Carmel
Tunnels, in Haifa, Israel) for eight hours causing massive congestion2.
The Distributed Network Protocol version 3 (DNP3) (IEEE, 2012) is one
of the standard SCADA protocols used to facilitate communications in smart
grid automation. The protocol is designed such that it can allow smart
grid nodes to collect, process, store and control data from DNP3-enabled
IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Devices)3. DNP3 provides a security mechanism
called Secure Authentication (DNP3-SA), which is used to secure end-to-end
communication in substations (Gilchrist, 2008).
Integrating security controls in SCADA protocols, such as authentication
and encryption are very important issues to consider in critical infrastruc-
tures since functionality, performance and behavioural correctness are cru-
cial. This is to ensure that embedded security mechanisms fit well and do
not contain errors that may weaken the security protection provided. The
current state of the DNP3-SA protocol is informally described in its specifi-
cations. Informal approaches have been known to be very useful in designing
1Wilhoit, K., 2013. The SCADA that didnt cry wolf. Tech. rep., On-
line: http://www.trendmicro.com.au/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-
papers/wp-the-scada-that-didnt-cry-wolf.pdf, Accessed: 1/09/14
2Peter, S.,2013. Hackers target Israels key tunnel road, cause its shut-down and severe
damage. Online: http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/517710/20131029/israel-cyber-security-
collective-hackers-attack-carmel.htm, Accessed: 10/01/2014
3Ambient, 2013. The smart grid node in a distributed intelligence grid architec-
ture. Online: http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hub/165743/file-56770063- pdf/docs/ambient dis-
tributed intelligence white paper.pdf, Ambient Corporation, Newton, MA, Accessed:
14/06/2014
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systems. However, they have also yielded inadequate methods which has
led to ambiguities and incompleteness (Bolignano et al., 2001; Hall, 2007).
Incompleteness among systems may introduce disturbing flaws because they
are more focused on functionality than rather behavioural correctness. Prov-
able security (Pass, 2011), which is a common method used to prove security
properties of cryptographic primitives, may be an option to deal with ambigu-
ities in systems. However, as attested in Bodei et al. (2005) and Pointcheval
(2005), the method is more effective for proving the properties of crypto-
graphic algorithms. Moreover, the provable approach lacks the support of
computer-aided tools and as a result it becomes prone to error (Ngo et al.,
2010). Formal methods (Woodcock et al., 2009), (which refers to the use
of rigorous mathematical techniques and tools for specification, design and
verification) provide the ability to construct precise and unambiguous mod-
els. These models can be analysed to reduce errors that are often introduced
in systems (Tretmans, 1999). This approach effectively helps to reduce the
efforts usually required by designers to manually investigate possible condi-
tions that may lead to unexpected events.
This paper presents a Coloured Petri Nets (CPN) (Jensen et al., 2007)
based approach that is used to create a parameterised model for DNP3-SA.
CPN is a formal and discrete-event modelling language for system design,
specification, simulation, validation and verification. Its graphical and pro-
gramming interfaces provide the ability to express concurrency in communi-
cation protocols, data networks, and creating concepts at different levels of
abstraction. Parameterisation in CPN is a technique used to create a single
model in order to prevent the possibility of having separate models for differ-
ent behaviours. Applications of CPN have been beneficial in modelling and
analysing various industrial processes; ranging from protocols and networks
to military systems (Tritilanunt et al., 2006; Floreani et al., 1996). DNP3-SA
operates in two modes: Non-aggressive Challenge-Response (NACR) and Ag-
gressive Mode (AGM). In our previous work, we provided a security analysis
of the NACR, with a focus on packet inspection at the reception level of an
outstation (Amoah et al., 2014). This paper extends our previous work by
adding the AGM mode. Specifically, our contribution is three fold. Firstly,
we use the concept of parameterisation to create a CPN model that covers the
two communication modes of the DNP3-SA; NACR and AGM. The model
is based on the specification and the experimental observations of real de-
vice behaviour (Substation Modernization Platform / Distribution Processor
Gateway (SMP4/DP)). We used the CPN state space analysis tool (Jensen
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et al., 2006) to validate the correctness of the model and check the authen-
tication property. Secondly, we identified a violation of the authentication
property in the aggressive mode through extensive state space analysis and
simulation using the parameterised model. The violation is revealed by a
previously unidentified security flaw in the NACR. The flaw allows an attack
to manipulation certain sequence of messages to execute commands. Thirdly,
by using the parameterised model, we present two different approaches that
are used to counter the identified flaw. We analyse the two proposed ap-
proaches to show that the flaw has been resolved.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an introduction to
DNP3. Section 3 and 4 respectively describe the approach used in mod-
elling, model description as well as colour set declarations. Section 5 presents
the validation and verification analysis of our DNP3-SA CPN model. Our
proposed solution is presented in Section 6. Finally, section 7 presents our
discussion, conclusion and future work of the paper.
2. Overview of the Distributed Network Protocol Version 3 (DNP3)
DNP3 is the defacto communication protocol for master stations and
outstations in power grids. Exchange of messages in the protocol is in the
form of requests and responses. Each of these messages (requests and re-
sponses) contain an application control field (AC), function code (FC) and
object header (OH). AC is used to determine whether a given fragment has
been received in the correct order. FC specifies the action of the request
or response sent. OH is supplementary information, usually associated with
DNP3 objects that may be required to create a complete DNP3 message.
DNP3 objects are index points within the protocol database software that
store data such as binary input/output, analog data, and counters. OHs may
sometimes be required to accompany function codes in messages to specify
what format, type or group of data a station must process and return as re-
sponse. For example, a master station may use the FC 0x01 and OH g12v1
to read the current analog input type value from the outstation. Further-
more, a response fragment contains an additional field called the Internal
Indicator (IIN). IINs are found in responses from outstations. They indicate
certain states and error conditions within outstations (IEEE, 2012, p. 13-23).
DNP3-SA is the security mechanism, which provides authentication in the
application layer of the DNP3 protocol. The mechanism ensures that sta-
tions are protected against “rogue applications” that may want to manipulate
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the protocol. The authentication mechanism is unilateral but it operates in
two ways; one-pass and two-pass authentication through a Keyed-Hash Mes-
sage Authentication Code (HMAC). Two-pass authentication is known as
the challenge-response or Non-aggressive challenge response (NACR) while
the one-pass is the aggressive mode (AGM). It is to be noted that before the
AGM (one-pass) operation can be carried out, there should be at least one or
more occurrences of the NACR operations. This enables the AGM to make
use of certain crucial components from NACR operation (this behaviour is
elaborated and illustrated in Figure 1). In terms of operation, DNP3-SA
strictly ensures that certain requests, particularly ‘critical requests ’, invoked
by either master stations or outstations, are challenged and authenticated
correctly for every session before they are further processed. A request or
unsolicited response is considered critical, if the message contains a manda-
tory code. A mandatory code is any code that can potentially control a given
station, by performing set-point adjustments or setting certain parameters.
Any station that makes use of mandatory codes in a given message shall be
challenged by the receiving device’s security mechanism to prove its identity.
Table 1 depicts a message sequence chart (MSC) that presents the be-
haviour of DNP3-SA. For simplicity, we have omitted the AC fields in all
DNP3 packets because they do not contribute to the result of this paper.
Master station and Outstation represent the communicating entities. Cskmo
is a controlling session key obtained from a long-term secret key, Lk, which
is manually distributed among the entities. The session key is used to au-
thenticate data transmitted in the control direction by the master station.
FC, OH and IIN respectively represent the function code, object header
and internal indicator data that may be contained in a request or response
(standard and error). Standard responses are expected responses for a partic-
ular request sent, while an error response could be a failure in authentication.
Chlg represents a challenge message. It contains a Challenge Sequence Num-
ber (CSQ), Sn that increases by i (where i ← 1) each time a challenge is
issued, a Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm, H and a nonce N .
HMAC1 and HMAC2 represent HMAC tags generated by the master sta-
tion and outstation respectively. Finally, UID represents a user identification
number, which is associated with the communicating parties.
In Table 1, NACR presents the non-aggressive challenge-response opera-
tion. The master station sends a request that requires a critical service to the
outstation. On receipt of the request, the outstation issues Chlg accordingly.
The master station uses H from Chlg and Cskmo to hash Chlg received, the
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request issued (FC,OH), and UID to compute its HMAC tag (HMAC1).
The HMAC tag is then sent to the outstation. On receipt of the tag, the
outstation uses the same computational approach and elements to generate
its tag (HMAC2) and checks if the tags match. If the tags match, then au-
thentication has been successful. The outstation processes the request and
replies to the master station with a standard response. Otherwise, an error
message is sent, which signifies that authentication has failed.
In Table 1, AGM illustrates the aggressive mode operation. In this
operation, we assume that the master has “the most recent challenge mes-
sage”. As previously stated, the AGM operation heavily depends on NACR.
That is, every last challenge message received by the master station during a
successful NACR operation, is considered to be the “most recently received
challenge message”. If a master station wishes to use the AGM operation
to communicate with an outstation, it is expected that the master station
must use all elements of the most recent challenge message, and only up-
date the CSQ to the next counter, before computation of the HMAC tag is
done. In Table 1, AGM shows that before the master station can send an
AGM request for a critical service, it first needs to compute an HMAC tag
(HMAC1) on the request about to be sent. The master use the most recent
challenge message, Chlg, and increased Sn by 1 to compute a valid HMAC
tag. In computing the HMAC tag, the methodology employed in NACR is
used. That is, the master station uses H from Chlg together with Cskmo
to hash the updated Chlg, request (about to sent), and UID to compute a
valid HMAC tag. After the tag has been obtained, the master station finally
sends the request together with HMAC1 to the outstation. On the receipt
of the message, the outstation stores the received tag, extract the FC and
OH from the request, and uses the same methodology to compute its own
HMAC tag (HMAC2, based on request received and an updated Sn). After
obtaining HMAC2, the outstation compares the tags. If the tags match,
then the request is further processed and a standard response is generated
and sent to the master station. Otherwise, an error message is generated. In
our next section, we will present a CPN model of the DNP3-SA protocol.
3. The CPN Model of DNP3-SA
As depicted in Figure 2, a CPN model consists of places (circular), tran-
sitions (rectangular) and directed arcs (arrows between places and transi-
tions). Places represent various states in a given model. They are assigned
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Figure 1: A MSG of SenderA and ReceiverA.
Figure 2: An example of a simple protocol - CPN model.
with colour sets (colsets). Colour sets are data types such as integer, string
and record that enable places to store data (token(s) or multisets - more
than one token). A place with a token(s) is known as a Marking. Transi-
tions signify events and they occur (i.e. moving a token from one place to
another), while directed arcs connects places to transitions. CPN also uses
other elements such as variables and functions. Variables represent colour
sets. They are typed and can be assigned values. An assigned variable on
an arc is referred to as a binding element. Moreover, whenever a transition
is said to have occurred, it represents a state change. For example, in Fig-
ure 1 we present a MSC depicting a simple protocol where SenderA transmits
messages to ReceiverA to introduce its users. The MSC is translated into a
CPN model, which is depicted in Figure 2. In this example, the process in
creating the model involve 4 steps; 1) identifying the communicating entities,
2) identifying the messages to be exchanged between the entities, 3) creat-
ing the channel for communication, and 4) identifying the data type for the
message to be exchange. The translation is as follows: In the MSC, SenderA
and ReceiverA are represented by places in the CPN model (SenderA and
ReceiverA, see Figure 2). The events of sending and receiving messages from
SenderA to ReceiverA are represented by 2 transitions: Sending Messages
and Receiving Messages. Messages on SenderA in the MSC are represented
as various tokens (multiset) on place SenderA of the CPN model. The net-
work part (which is the arc that connects SenderA to ReceiverA in the MSC)
is represented by place Network in the CPN model. Finally, the transmission
of each messages from SenderA to ReceiverA in the MSC is represented with
the CPN variable msg (see msg on arcs from SenderA to ReceiverA).
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3.1. CPN Modelling Approach
Two modelling approaches, which are specific to DNP3-SA were used:
Protocol Abstraction and Model Parameterisation with Adversaries.
Protocol Abstraction: In translating and obtaining a complete model
for DNP3-SA, we made use of DNP3 specification, two Substation Modern-
ization Platform / Distribution Processor Gateway (SMP4/DP) devices from
Cooper Power Systems4, and a Linux-based computer and a switch. The idea
is to set up a small SCADA network mimicking the behaviour of typical sub-
station in a power distribution network. SMP4 devices are used to convert
almost any protocol to another using various protocol libraries. For testing
purposes, they can also be configured to act as a master station or slave by
using preloaded protocol templates. In our case, we configured one of the
devices as a DNP3 master and the other device to behave as a DNP3 slave.
With preloaded templates, the slave could conveniently generate DNP3 data
objects internally for testing. Then, we set up our Linux-based computer
to continuously monitor traffic from the master station and outstation. The
motivation of this test-bed is to obtain precise protocol behaviour such the
relationship between NACR and AGM.
Model Parameterisation with Adversaries: This approach is used
to prevent the possibility of having separate models in order to obtain dif-
ferent behaviours for analysis. It provides the ability to combine multiple
instances of certain behaviours seamlessly. They are usually enforced on ei-
ther arc inscriptions, transition guards, or even code regions. Our model uses
parameterisation to combine our attack models as well as other behaviours
that are not stated in the DNP3-SA’s specification. By doing so, it gives us
the ability to control when to turn them ON←true or OFF←false; depend-
ing on the environment for testing. This paper only considers the generic
adversaries stated in the protocol specification; modification, spoofing and
replay. These attacks are considered because they have been stated in the
protocol specification to be addressed by DNP3-SA. Therefore, parameteri-
sation gives us flexibility to re-use our existing model. The same model can
behave differently depending on the parameters provided for analysis.
4Coopers Power Systems, 2013. Reference manual, DNP3 master and slave protocol.
Online: http://www.cooperpower.com, Chicago, IL, Accessed: 11/06/2014
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3.2. Assumptions
Without loss of generality, we make the following assumptions:
1) The master station can use both security modes (NACR and AGM)
in communicating with an outstation. 2) Master station will be the
sole entity that initiates communication; sending of request. 3) Both
entities have their long-term secret keys as well as session keys pre-
established. 4) Every request transmitted from the master station is
considered as a critical request. 5) The underlying layers of the protocol
via the network are reliable.
4. Model Description
This section presents the CPN colour set declarations and the hierar-
chical CPN model of DNP3-SA. The hierarchical model consists of three
modules: A top-level CPN page, a second-level CPN page and 14 third-level
CPN pages. The top-level and second-level pages are used to simplify the
complexities of the model. The third-level pages present details of the model.
4.1. Colour set Declaration
Table 2 presents a sample declaration (DNP3-SA messages to CPN map-
ping) for NACR and AGM request messages in DNP3-SA CPN. The com-
plete list of messages can be found in the Appendix A (Table A.7). Ta-
ble 2 consists of three columns: Remarks, Components and CPN declara-
tions. Remarks in the table present the various types of messages used in
the model. Components show the elements that make up the various mes-
sages. CPN declarations present the translation of DNP3 messages into
the CPN language. For example, in the Requests row of the table (Ta-
ble 2), we show that a request fragment is made up of FC and OH com-
ponents. These components have their corresponding CPN declarations set
to be colset fcode & oheader. The colour sets (fcode & oheader) have
a timed string as their data types. In addition, both colour sets have also
been assigned with timed token values: 1‘(“0x01”)@1++ 1‘(“0x02”)@2
1‘(“0x03”)@3, & 1‘(“g20v1”)@1++ 2‘(“g20v7”)@2 respectively. The to-
kens values; 1‘(“0x01”), 1‘(“0x02”) and 1‘(“0x03”) represent DNP3 messages
Read, Write and Initiate Application respectively. In summary, a com-
plete NACR CPN request from Table 2 is modelled as the product of Fcode
and oheader; (“0x01”,“g20v1”). While AGM request is modelled as the
product of colour set Request and hmac (refer to Table A.7 for details).
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Table 2: CPN Declaration for DNP3-SA Model
Remarks Components CPN Declarations
Requests
FC
Val allrqfc = 1‘(“0x01”)@1++ 1‘(“0x02”)@2++ 1‘(“0x03”)@3;
Colset fcode = string timed; Var f:fcode
OH
Val alloh = 1‘(“g20v1”)@1++ 2‘(“g20v7”)@2;
Colset oheader = string timed; Var oh:oheader
CPN Request Colset Request = product fcode*oheader
CPN AGM Request Colset AGrequest = product Request*hmac
Figure 3: DNP3-SA CPN model - Top-level page.
4.2. DNP-SA CPN Model Specification
Top-level Page: Figure 3 shows the main page for the DNP3-SA CPN
model. It presents an abstract view of the model on a single page. It consti-
tutes of three substitution transitions (Tsub); Master station, Network MITM
and Outstation. A substitution transition is a page (submodule) with multi-
ple layers of details. The directed arcs between the substitution transitions
indicate that the destination page is also a submodule of the source page.
Second-level Page: Figure 4 shows the multi-stage page of the DNP3-
SA CPN model. It consists of eight different substitution transitions. In
the figure, all substitution transitions are marked with a number to in-
dicate the flow of messages in the model. On the far-left of the figure
(Figure 4), Tsub; SendRequests, MasterRecv & MasSecure model the be-
haviour of the master station. The middle part of the figure depicts Tsub;
NETWORK MITM (the network and other activities such as a man-in-the mid-
dle attack (MITM)). Finally, the far-right side of the figure presents Tsub;
OutRecv Send, CHGenerator, OutSecure & OProcess, model the outsta-
tion’s behaviour. Each module presented in this page has details of its
behaviour presented on a third-level page. For example, details of Tsub
MasterRecv (8) & Network MITM (2) are depicted in Figure 5 & 6 respec-
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tively. To improve readability and understanding, third-level pages that are
relevant and contribute to this paper are presented in Appendix B).
Figure 5 depicts details of the final step in the model; Tsub MasterRecv.
In this figure, the master station receives and stores responses from the out-
station. Furthermore, as the master station receives responses, it can also
enable itself and execute subsequent requests through Tsub SendRequests.
Figure 6 presents Tsub Network MITM, a third-level page from Figure 4. It
presents details of the network as well as parameterised attack behaviours
carried out by a Man-In-The-Middle attack (MITM). For clarity, this figure
marks the second process after Tsub SendRequests from Figure 4 has occured.
It is divided into three parts; top, middle and bottom to emphasise the
activities involved. The top part of the figure (starting from the left transition
ConnectA) depicts the transmission NACR requests from the master station
through SendRq and forward it to the outstation via sendRq. Similarly on
the far right, transition Connect AGM signifies the transmission of the AGM
request from the master through place SendAGMRq to the outstation via
sendAGRq. If any of the MITM parameters (guard functions on transition
LReplayA & Connect AGM ) are set to true, it may enable the attacker to
launch malicious activities such as modifying, replaying requests or spoofing
identity (particularly the master) in an attempt to gain access or even a
command on the outstation.
The middle part of the figure (refer to transition ConnectC, starting from
the bottom) depicts the transmission of challenge messages from the outsta-
tion to the master station through place SendChlg1 to sendChlg1. Similarly
on the far right, it is depicted that transition Sol ConnectC sends challenge
messages from the outstation to the master via SendChlg2 to sendChlg2.
Here, if the attack parameter (arc inscriptions on the places) is set to true,
it is expected that the attacker will be able modify values in every passing
challenge message from the outstation to the master. It is to be noted that
transition Sol ConnectC parameter is set to false. The transition is set to
false because it is not considered as a behaviour of the DNP3-SA protocol.
At the bottom of the figure, transition ConnectB, place SendRsp and
sendRsp are depicted. They model the transmission of response from the
outstation to the master station.
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Figure 5: The master receiving responses - Third-level page.
Figure 6: The master sending requests - Third-level page.
5. Validation and Verification of DNP3-SA CPN Model
We perform the validation of DNP3-SA using CPN’s state space analysis
tool (Jensen et al., 2006). In validating the DNP3-SA CPN model, it is
important to consider the following: 1) formally defining the authentication
property using the Computational Tree Logic (CTL), which is supported by
CPN tools and 2) ensuring that the MITM attacks in the model as well as
other behaviours, which are not part of the protocol specification for now
14
are set to false. This is to help determine whether the model reflects the
protocol behaviour under normal circumstances.
Analysis using the state space presents a report with a number of be-
havioural properties. These properties include home markings, dead mark-
ings, live and dead transitions among others (discussed later during the val-
idation stage). In this paper, we are interested in dead markings and dead
transitions. Dead markings are states that do not have binding elements to
make them active (Jensen et al., 2007). They represent termination points
in the model. Dead transitions on the other hand, are transitions that can-
not be executed because there exists no path from a reachable marking to
enable them. These properties are of interest due to their ability in effec-
tively simplifying the analyses of large and complex models without loosing
the generality of the concepts. For instance, throughout these analyses we
expect a single dead marking representing the outstation processing all re-
quests after authentication for each request has been successful. We also
expect 14 dead transitions during the initial validation process; where out of
the 14 transitions, 2 of them represent the absence of attack models. The
remaining transitions depict other parameters that are set to false; consist-
ing of attacks parameters as well as other behaviours that are not part the
DNP3-SA’s specification. It is to be noted dead transitions are subjective to
change during all analyses. This is as a result of some dead transitions such
as attack models that might later be set to true.
5.1. Formalising the Authentication Property of DNP3-SA
For all validations, verifications, and evaluation purposes, we define and
later formally represent the authentication property using CTL.
Authentication condition: The outstation is able to verify the identity of
the master station, if the master station is able to produce a valid HMAC tag;
where the tag is the same as the tag computed by the outstation. Thus, if the
tags are the same, then authentication is successful, otherwise, authentication
fails. A pass during authentication leads to a single state where IIN values;
‘‘00 IIN 1’’ or ‘‘00 IIN 2’’ are obtained on place M Internal of the Tsub
MasterRecv (8) (refer to Figure 5 for details). If for any reasons, values
other than the expected values are obtained on M Internal, then authenti-
cation has failed. This requirement applies regardless of whether the attack
parameters are set to true or false, or the mode of operation employed is
NACR or AGM.
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Definition of the authentication property corresponds to a subset of places
in Tsub OutSecure (6) and MasterRecv (8) in Figure 4. Interested readers
can also make reference to Figure 5, and Figure B.19 of the Appendix B
for details. In Tsub OutSecure (6) (Figure B.19 of Appendix B for details)
three (3) places were used. That is, a place called StoreHMAC models the
storage area for HMAC tags from the master station. The second place is
called OHMAC. It models the outstation’s storage area for its own HMAC tags.
Whiles the third place is called AuthStatus, it models the authentication
status (i.e. an authentication pass or fail). In Tsub MasterRecv (8), a single
place called M Internal models the storage area for IIN values on the master
station (refer to Figure 5).
The following are CTL statements that are used in formalising the prop-
erty. [Ev(A): FORALL UNTIL(TT, A), TT] refers to a truth value. This
operator returns a true value if all paths, from a given state, lead to a state
where A is true. [Pos: EXIST UNTIL(TT, A), TT] refers to a truth value.
This operator also returns a true value if there exists at least one path, from
a given state, that leads to a state where A is true. This IMCPN denotes to
our initial CPN model without attacks. MITMCPN denotes our attack model in
IMCPN. MDA, RPA, SPA denotes modification, replay and spoofing attack models
carried out by a MITM respectively. MRSA denotes all attacks set to true in
MITMCPN. M0 denotes the initial marking or state in IM
CPN, [M0〉 denotes the set
of reachable markings from M0 and (SAM(Mi, P
PlaceName) denotes a place name
at a marking Mi (Mi ∈ [M0〉). Furthermore, Mtag and Otag represent the master
station and the outstation calculated HMAC tags. MOTrue and MOFalse repre-
sent the match and mismatch of HMAC tags. Tgtrue and TgFalse represent
authentication pass or failure. Finally, It and If denote the IIN values to be
obtained on the master station (M Internal on Figure 5).
Property - Authentication Property
Predicates for IMCPN :
- Mtag Mi = (SAM(Mi, P
StoreMAC)) 6= ∅
- Otag Mi = (SAM(Mi, P
OHMAC)) 6= ∅
- MOTrue Mi = (SAM(Mi, P
OHMAC)) = (SAM(PStoreMAC))
- MOFalse Mi = (SAM(Mi, P
OHMAC)) 6= (SAM(PStoreMAC))
- TgTrue Mi = (SAM(Mi, P
AuthStatus)) = 1‘"Authpass"
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- TgFalse Mi = (SAM(Mi, P
AuthStatus)) = 1‘"Authfail"
- It Mi = (SAM(Mi, P
M Internal)) = (1‘"00 IIN 1") ∨ (1‘"00 IIN 2")
- If Mi = (SAM(Mi, P
M Internal)) = (1‘"sysfail")
DNP3-SA is agreed to have an uncompromising authentication property, iff
IMCPN ∨ MITMCPN have the following behaviour:
- If all attacks carried out in MITMCPN are false, then
∀ Mi ∈ [M0〉 Ev(MOTrue Mi ∧ TgTrue Mi ∧ It Mi) ∧
¬Pos(TgFalse Mi ∧ If Mi)
- Otherwise, if MDA ∨ RPA ∨ SPA ∨ MRSA in MITMCPN are true, then
∃ Mi ∈ [M0〉 Ev(MOFalse Mi ∧ TgFalse Mi ∧ If Mi) ∧
¬Pos(TgTrue Mi ∧ It Mi)
Table 3: State Space Reports - DNP3-SA CPN Model
State Space Report for DNP3-SA CPN Model
Initial CPN Model (IMCPN)
MITM Atttacks (MITMCPN)
MDA RPA SPA MRSA
State Space Nodes 299 252 706 117 11733
State Space Arcs 338 289 921 239 34894
SCC Graph Nodes 299 252 706 117 11733
SCC Graph Arcs 338 289 921 239 34894
Dead Markings 1 1 1 6 72
Dead Transitions 14 17 17 28 12
5.2. Validation of DNP3-SA CPN model
We present the full state space reports of DNP3-SA CPN model with
all attacks stated in the specification. The table consists of two groups;
Initial CPN model (IMCPN) and MITM Attacks (MITMCPN). IMCPN implies that
all attack parameters are set to false. MITMCPN implies that one or more
attacks have can be set to true, henceforth switched on.
IMCPN in Table 3 depicts that the State Space Nodes and Arcs have match-
ing values with the Strongly Connected Components (SCC) Graph Nodes
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and Arcs. SCC is a property used to determine the reachability of nodes and
iterations in models. Obtaining the same values for state space and SCC
indicates that every nodes in the model is reachable from any other nodes.
Furthermore, there exists no loops in the model that may render the model
to have infinite occurrences.
The report also shows that there exists one dead marking; instance (299)
and 14 dead transitions. These imply that the obtained values are consistent
with our expectations defined in Section 5. The reason is that the single
dead marking obtained represents a single state. This single state is where
each request transmitted by the master station is successfully authenticated
by the outstation. Thus, leading to the occurrences of all transitions in Tsub
Process except Tsub AuthErr, which is a submodule embedded in OProcess
- 7 (refer to Figure 4 and Figure B.20 in Appendix B). Tsub AuthErr marks
authentication error in module OProcess - 7 (refer to Figure B.20 in Ap-
pendix B for details). Moreover, a closer inspection on the dead transitions
revealed that all 14 dead transitions are consistent as well. That is, two (2)
out of the 14 dead transitions were found to be inactive, because no attack
was turned ON. They reflected the generation points for authentication error
messages (Tsub AuthErr of Figure B.20). The 12 remaining transitions re-
flected other activities (not part of DNP3-SA’s specification) and all attack
behaviours that are set to false. Achieving this behaviour concludes that
the DNP3-SA CPN model behaves as expected, as the model is able to verify
the authenticity of the master station for every request executed.
5.3. Verifying DNP3-SA against attacks stated in the specification
The following attacks are carried out by a MITM, which have been per-
ameterised in the DNP3-SA CPN model (refer to Figure 6)
• MDA denotes modification attack, where the attacker is able to modify
packets such as requests and contents of challenge messages.
• RPA denotes replay attack, where the attacker is able to replay any
messages from the master station.
• SPA denotes spoofing attack, where the attacker is allowed to masquer-
ade as the master station to the outstation.
• MRSA denotes all attacks are set to true. This allows the attacker to
launch all attacks.
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MITMCPN in Table 3 presents the reports for all attacks that have been set to
true in DNP3-SA CPN model. From the table, MDA and RPA present a single
dead marking is obtained for each. A close inspection revealed that the dead
marking obtained for each attack represents the termination of all executed
requests with all their authentication failing; leading to the execution of Tsub
AuthErr. As a result, 17 dead transitions were obtained for each attack. A
close inspection on the obtained dead transitions revealed that, out of 17, five
(5) of them marked various activities such as reading, writing or initiating
an application in Tsub OProcess that did not occur. This is as a result of the
attacks. The remaining 12 dead transitions marked paremeterised transitions
that are set to false. These results are consistent with our expectations and
implies that the authentication property hold.
MITMCPN, SPA in Table 3 presents 6 dead markings and 28 dead transitions
obtained. This attack behaviour rendered the model to become inaccessible.
This behaviour is expected, as our attack model is under the assumption
that session keys between the stations are pre-shared before the attack. This
behaviour leads DNP3-SA CPN model to hang and not to complete success-
fully. This, does not affect the behaviour of the protocol nor does it renders
the protocol to be inaccessible in real life. In practice, a timer allows the
protocol to drop a given transaction after a threshold. We, however, carried
out this analysis to further investigate impacts and benefits it has on the
DNP3-SA (i.e. used in conjunction with other attack models).
5.4. Evaluation of DNP3-SA CPN model
In this section, we set all attack parameters to true. This combines all
attacks behaviours specified above. Then, we set place Tagcount of Figure 6
to the value 1 and also set the modification attack parameter to manipulate
the challenge message from the outstation (refer to the middle part of Fig-
ure 6). These settings are very crucial because: 1) it enables the attacker to
gather enough data after two (2) initial requests have been successful exe-
cuted on the outstation during NACR operation, and 2) the master station
can consider the last challenge data from the outstation as its most recent
challenge data for AGM operations.
MITMCPN, MRSA in Table 3 presents 72 instances of dead markings and only
12 dead transitions. Results obtained in this report imply that the model
has certain unexpected behaviours. This is as a result of the high number of
dead markings obtained. This behaviour, therefore calls for further investi-
gations. We define three (3) SML queries and use the interactive simulation
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provided by the CPN tools to conduct the investigations. The SML query
functions include: ListDeadMarkings(), SearchNodes and reachability. List-
DeadMarkings() is used to list all dead markings identified in the model.
SearchNodes is used to search for all possible paths of a given marking. For
example, identifying a marking that represents the state of the attacker in
the model. Reachability is a property focused in determining whether there
exists an occurrence sequence starting from the marking of node A to the
marking of node B. In the model, reaching at least a single state from where
the attacker can transmit request and the authentication for that request
fails; implies that the authentication property holds in DNP3-SA. On the
contrary (from the attacker’s state), if one can still reach a state where the
authentication is successful then, the authentication property is said to be
violated.
In the analysis, we used ListDeadMarkings() to obtained all dead mark-
ings stated in the report and further simulate them individually. Simulating
all the obtained markings enabled us to classify the dead markings into two
(2) main groups: expected and unexpected. According to the configuration of
the model, an expected marking is a state, where it is expected that only two
(2) of the initial requests are being successfully executed on the outstation,
but having subsequent requests failing. However, for a state that has more
than two (2) of its initial requests successfully executed on the outstation
implies that, it is an unexpected dead marking. From the simulation, 36
instances (which ranged from 11698 − 11733) of unexpected dead markings
were listed (not listed due of space limitations). Obtaining these instances
require a close inspection. The inspection leads to the usage of the SearchN-
odes query. We used the SearchNodes query within a function to search for
all possible paths that issued requests from the attacker state. This is to
search and return at least one node value.
Figure 7 depicts our results. The top-side of the figure presents the
SearchNodes queries used within a function and its outcome. The node
value obtained from the query (96) is used against all the unexpected dead
markings (11698−11733) to determine if it is possible to reach them. At the
bottom of Figure 7, the reachability statements used are depicted. The state-
ments returned true values for all the unexpected dead markings instances;
implying that all instances are reachable from the attacker state. Relating
this outcome to the authentication property defined in Section 5.1 implies
that the property has been violated in the presence of this attack model.
Even though, the attacker does not possess the key to compute valid tags for
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Figure 7: Outcomes of SML queries used in DNP3-SA CPN model - Third-level page.
authentication; a write command has been successfully executed on an IED
in the model (transition T writeB). Observations and Results: Inspect-
ing the results through simulation revealed that there exists instances where
the attacker, without the knowledge of any key, is capable of replaying valid
AGM messages to execute commands on the outstation; writing or reading
values or even initiating an application on an IED during the AGM opera-
tion. Since the protocol messages are transmitted in ‘cleartext’, requests and
challenge messages can be manipulated, which can prevent relevant protocol
sequences from completing during the NACR mode. For instance, randomly
manipulating CSQs or nonces in challenge messages can cause loss of synchro-
nisation and unexpected authentication failures. In the model the attacker
instead, can sequentially manipulate the CSQ in the challenge message to
the next counter value after observing that the CSQ value increases by one
for every session. This is because the CSQ value can be predicted easily;
allowing the CSQ value to be set higher. In doing so, both stations are
‘fooled’ into producing HMAC tags, which result in an authentication failure
during the NACR verification process. Although, the tag verification fails
in the NACR mode, the same (old) tag becomes valid if the tag is coupled
with a particular request and used during AGM mode of operation. Thus,
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when an authentication fails during NACR, the outstation still continues to
update its CSQ for its next challenge. Understanding this flaw enables the
attacker to replay the old tag (previously captured from the master station
during NACR mode) to the outstation as an aggressive message. In doing
so, a successful execution of a command can be carried out via transition
T writeB (refer to Figure B.20 in Appendix B). In our model, this behaviour
has led to identifying 12 out 17 expected dead transitions. Therefore, this
behaviour violates the authentication property defined in Section 5.1.
6. Proposed Solutions for the Identified Flaw
Analyses using the DNP3-SA CPN model have proven the protocol can
withstand individual attacks stated in the DNP3 specification. However, the
model has also revealed a flaw when all attacks are enabled. In the protocol
specification, it is stated that the aggressive mode operation is “somewhat
more secure against replay attacks”. Analysis from our model has revealed
a flaw in the protocol, which is inherited from the NACR mode. The flaw
allows an attacker, without possessing any key to replay a valid HMAC tag
(old message) from one mode of operation to another, and execute commands
on the outstation. Impacts of such attacks on real-life critical systems such
as the smart grid can be extremely detrimental. As a result, we present and
model two (2) approaches that can be used to fix the flaw identified. The
proposed approaches are further validated and verified using the model.
6.1. Solution 1: HMAC for challenges data
In Table 4, we depict an approach that suggests the computation of an
HMAC tag on the challenge message from either the master station or out-
station; depending on who the challenger is. Computation of the tag is
based on user association ID and hash functions (such as SHA-HMAC and
AES-GMAC) already used in the DNP3-SA protocol. Table 4 illustrates the
master station sending a critical request to the outstation. On receipt of the
request, the outstation generates Chalg (Sn,H,N). Chalg is then used to-
gether with UID by the outstation as input elements to compute CHMAC0.
CHMAC0 is computed by using H from Chalg, the session key, Cskmo and
the input elements (Chalg, UID). The outstation, then sends a message
comprising of CHMAC0 and Chalg to the master station. On receipt of the
message, the master station uses its UID and Chalg from the outstation as
its inputs to compute CHMAC1. Then, the master station compares the
22
tags for equality. If the tags match, the master station is triggered through
(ETHMAC) to compute an HMAC tag on the initial request. Otherwise, the
protocol logs the failure and aborts the operation (logError&Abort). This
behaviour will prevent the master station (responder) from being ‘tricked’
into computing a valid HMAC tag, which will later become beneficial to the
attacker for a successful attack. This approach also helps to prevent the out-
station from automatically updating its CSQ when a reply (expected HMAC
tag on the ‘waiting to process request’) is not yet received.
Master Station Outstation
Cskmo ⇐ Lk ⇒ Cskmo
NACR
Request← (FC,OH) Request−−−−→
Chalg ← (Sn,H,N)
(CHMAC0,Chalg)←−−−−−−−−−−− CHMAC0 ← HCsk(Chalg,UID)
CHMAC1 ← HCsk(Chalg,UID)
Verify HMAC Tags
If(CHMAC1 = CHMAC0)then
ETHMAC ← (FC,OH, IIN) ETHMAC−−−−−−→
Else
logError&Abort
:
:
Table 4: Solution 1 implementation of HMAC for challenge messages.
6.2. Solution 2: Randomisation for CSQ / Limiting CSQ to AGM
According to the DNP3-SA standards, CSQ is a mechanism used to se-
quentially maintain a match of replies (responses) between stations. That is,
CSQs in stations are set to zero (0) at startup. However, the CSQs increase
by 1 each time a station challenges or requires authentication. Our experi-
ments on real devices (SMP4) has revealed that the mechanism (CSQ) is not
only used for synchronisation but it also serves as a key element for imple-
menting the AGM mode of operation (i.e. transitioning from one mode of
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operation to another (NACR to AGM) for less bandwidth usage (see IEEE,
2012, p. 175)). Analysis from DNP3-SA CPN model has revealed a flaw as-
sociated with the CSQ, because the attacker could easily guess what the next
CSQ will be. As a result, a successful replay attack was carried out. Ran-
domising CSQs during the NACR operation will make it almost impractical
for the attack to be successful. This is because, each time the CSQ is issued,
the value is chosen at random; making it difficult for the attacker to guess
what the next value could be. This approach, although proves promising,
may lead on to increase in protocol overheads.
We recommend an alternative way over randomisation. We suggest that
the protocol will be better off discarding the use of the CSQ mechanism in
the NACR mode. Instead, we suggest the CSQ mechanism to be introduced
solely in the AGM mode rather than being an active component of the NACR
mode operation. The presence of the CSQ mechanism in NACR is seemingly
redundant. As a result, it leads to manipulation; launching successful attack
on real-life systems. We suggest that the pseudo-random number (nonce)
and the MAC algorithm in the challenge message will be effective (sufficient)
components to run the NACR mode without difficulties. However, if for any
reason the AGM mode is to be carried out for operations, then we advise on
the following: 1) integrating the CSQ mechanism as part of the AGM op-
eration and 2) making use of NACR’s challenge (‘the most recent challenge
message’, which consists of the nonce + MAC algorithm). We illustrate our
solution in Table 5, under the assumption that the CSQ mechanism is part of
the AGM and not the NACR operation. Table 5 shows that after a request is
received by the outstation, the outstation issues Chalg0 to the master station.
It is to be noted that Chalg0 is composed of only H,N (HMAC algorithm
and nonce). However, for the AGM operation, computation of the HMAC
tag is based on Chalg0 (H&N) and includes Sn (represented as Chalg1).
This approach (i.e. introducing CSQ in AGM) still provides synchronisation
among other stations. However, the real benefit is that the computation of
the HMAC tag for the AGM request will be completed before an attack will
be able to guess the CSQ. This approach deters tricking stations during the
NACR operation to compute valid tag; which later can be replayed with
a request to carry out an event. Finally, this approach also helps to pre-
vent challengers (outstations) from updating their CSQs automatically when
authentication fails during a NACR operation.
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6.3. Specification of New DNP3-SA CPN model
Through parameterisation, we implement new behaviours (our proposed
solutions 1 and 2) in DNP3-SA CPN model. The parameters of our solutions
were set to false by default during the initial validation of DNP3-SA CPN.
In this section, we present them and set their parameters to true to validate
and verify the new DNP3-SA CPN model with the flaw identified.
The behaviour details of proposed solution 1 is presented in Figures 8
& 9. Explanation of these figures are aligned with the MSC provided in
Table 4 (HMAC for challenges messages). Transition Secure Challenge
Data in Tsub OSecureCH in Figure 8 uses the elements of the challenge data
together with the session key and the current user ID to create a HMAC tag
on the challenge data. After the tag has been obtained from place Ctag1, the
tag is later coupled with the challenge data and sent to the master station
via place SendChlg2. In Figure 9, transition RecvCH of the master station
receives the secure challenge message (i.e. challenge data and HMAC tag on
the challenge). Using the same methodology, the master station computes a
tag on the challenge data through transition ChlgAuth for verification, via
transition tagCheck. From tagCheck, if the tag match, a pass token is sent
to enable the master station to reply to the challenge, as the outstation is
waiting to process the request. Otherwise, the protocol generates a security
log indicating unmatched tags for the challenge data and aborts the operation
as a result of an attack.
Figure 10 & 11 illustrate the behaviour of the proposed solution 2 in
DNP3-SA CPN model. Explanation of these figures are also aligned with
the MSC provided in Table 5. In Figure 10, place CSQ is independent of the
NACR operation (refer to top left of the figure). But place RecentCHM is an
active element of both NACR and AGM. The reason as to why RecentCHM
is serving both modes of operation is because, RecentCHM enables the AGM
operation to make use of the most recently received challenge data from the
outstation (refer to bottom left of Figure 10). In the same figure (Figure 10),
transition SecureAGM becomes enabled through its incoming arcs only if, an
AGM request is about to be sent to the outstation. This causes SecureAGM
to compute an HMAC tag on the request. It is to be noted from the figure
(Figure 10), the tag is computed by consuming tokens from RecentCHM, CSQ
and the surrounding places of transition SecureAGM. Then, when the incom-
ing arcs of transition AGMPack are satisfied, an AGM request (request to be
sent and the computed HMAC tag) is sent to the outstation. In Figure 11,
the outstation extracts and stores HMAC tags from the master station on
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Figure 8: Outstation secures the challenge data by generating an HMAC on the challenge
data before it is transmitted to the master station - Third-level page.
Figure 9: Master station receives the challenge with the HMAC from the outstation,
generates HMAC tag based on the challenge for verification - Third-level page.
place StoreAMac. Then, when tokens from surrounding arcs of transition
SecureO AG mode are consumed, an HMAC tag is created. In this process,
it is also important to note that the place CSQ is part of the computation of
the AGM tag (refer to lower-left of Figure 11). The final step of this process
is the verification of the tags. The tag verification is achieved with a CPN
function AGMverifytags on transition Tagcheck2. That is, if the tags match
or fail, a pass or fail token is generated to place AuthStatus. The status of
verification is then sent to Tsub OProcess (Figure 4) for processing.
6.4. Validation and Verification of the Proposed Solutions in DNP3-SA CPN
This section presents the analysis of our new DNP3-SA CPN model. Here,
we validate the solutions as before to determine if the proposed solutions are
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Figure 10: Master station computes AGM request using the CSQ as well as the most
recent challenge message received - Third-level page.
Figure 11: Outstation computes HMAC tag by using the CSQ and the previous most
recently issued challenge data - Third-level page.
valid. Furthermore, we also verify each of the solutions against the attack
model, MRSM0 . It is to be noted that throughout this analysis, it is expect
that we obtain a single dead marking just as previously stated in Section 5.
6.4.1. Validation of Solutions 1 and 2
IMCPN in Table 6 depicts the reports of our proposed solutions (refer to
Figure 8 and 9, and Figure 10 and 11). For solution 1, a single dead mark-
ing (317) with 8 dead transitions were obtained. The report of solution 2
also presents a single dead marking; 434 with 15 dead transitions. Close
inspections on both reports revealed that the obtained dead marking and
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Table 6: State Space Reports - Refined DNP3-SA CPN Model
State Space Report for Refined DNP3-SA CPN Model
Initial CPN model (IMCPN) MITM Atttacks (MITMCPN)
Sol1 Sol2 Sol1-MRSM0 Sol2-MRSM0
State Space Nodes 317 434 72 411
State Space Arcs 356 642 71 472
SCC Graph Nodes 317 434 72 411
SCC Graph Arcs 356 642 71 472
Dead Markings 1 1 1 1
Dead Transitions 8 15 20 9
transitions are consistent with our expectations (as MRSM0 is to set false).
Verification of Solution 1
MITMCPN, Sol1 in Table 6 presents the report generated for solution 1. The
report depicts a single dead marking and 20 dead transitions. As previously
stated in Section 5.4, 72 instances of dead markings were obtained and later
categorised in two (2) main groups: expected and unexpected. For this
revised model, we have obtained a single dead marking (i.e. 317). Using the
previous definition of the expected dead markings in Section 5.4, we conduct
an investigation on our current results. This is to determine whether the
marking obtained in this analysis is expected or not. Thus, in this analysis
we expect a true value from our reachability statement. A truth value
from the statement will imply that the model does not allow the attack
model to execute any command to the outstation, after one or two initial
requests have been issued by the master station. But, if it is possible for
the attacker to execute a command after the expected initial requests from
the master station, then it implies that the obtained dead marking is not
expected. Henceforth, the authentication property does not hold. Figure 12
presents the results from the queries used. A function with the embedded
SearchNodes was used to capture the state where the attacker is potentially
able to ‘fool’ the master station and send AGM requests to the outstation.
The query returned the node value; 62. We then use the obtained value (62)
with the single dead marking (72) to determine its reachability status. The
reachability query has returned true; emphasising that an attacker cannot
reach a state where it can launch any command to the outstation (hence
verifying solution 1). This behaviour indicates the authentication property
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Figure 12: Outcomes of SML queries used in our Refined DNP3-SA CPN model.
holds because the model has detected the attack behaviour. Moreover, as a
result of detecting the attack, the model aborts any further operations that
will lead to the successful execution of a command on an outstation. As a
result of this behaviour, 20 dead transitions were identified not to have occur
(including solution 2 because its parameters have been set to false).
Verification of Solution 2
MITMCPN, Sol2 in Table 6 presents the report of our second solution against
MRSM0 . The report presents a single dead marking (411) and 9 dead transi-
tions. In this analysis, we use the simulation approach to conduct further
studies on the obtained results. The sequential execution of the simulation
revealed that the single dead marking (411) is consistent with our expectation
(hence verifying solution 2). The single dead marking obtained represents
the successful execution of legitimate requests from the master station to the
outstation; leading to execution of operational transitions on Tsub OProcess
(refer to FigureB.20 of Appendix B for details). Other NACR or AGM re-
quests issued by the attack rendered Tsub AuthErr to execute; leading to
authentication error messages (refer to Figure B.20 in Appendix B for de-
tails). Thus, every attempt to guess or manipulate the challenge data leads
to a failure during authentication. The execution of Tsub AuthErr as a result
of attempts from the attack model accounts for the identification of only 9
dead transitions in the analysis. These dead transitions represent behaviours
of solution 1 (Figure 8 and 9), which have been set to false in the DNP3-SA
CPN model.
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7. Discussion and Conclusion
The work in this paper has presented detailed behavioural analyses of the
DNP3-SA protocol using Coloured Petri Nets. Analysis of the protocol has
revealed a flaw, which was not previously been identified during the design
phase of the protocol. In our model, we cause a DNP3 slave to replay a
previously executed command for certain DNP3 objects. The flaw identified
can lead to serious consequences as it allows an attacker to ‘fool’ a responder
into producing valid HMAC tag. The tag can later be coupled with the pre-
vious request and be replayed as an AGM request to carry out an unexpected
events on an outstation. For example, assuming during NACR mode of oper-
ation, a write function is executed to either set the time on an outstation for
synchronisation of certain crucial data or set an analog deadband value on
the outstation. An attacker who is successful in ‘fooling’ the master station
into producing a valid tag for that operation can perform the same set of
functions in the aggressive mode on the outstation and even write arbitrary
values. In effect, the flaw violates the authentication property during the
AGM operation.
CPN’s parameterisation methodology helps us combine multiple instances
of different behaviours into one model. This enabled us to test for various at-
tack scenarios and develop countermeasures against the flaw identified. We
have shown that a CPN model can help developers to identify a flaw and
implement the most effective countermeasures. Through our parameterised
new models, we have formally evaluated our proposed approaches, which
have proven to resolve the flaw identified through: 1) calculating HMAC on
challenge data, and 2) implementing the CSQ as a sole active component
of the AGM operation. With this work, we have shown the feasibility and
power of formal methods in identifying and verifying SCADA protocol flaws.
The complexities of initially building the model may be seen as a drawback,
however, the model needs to be developed once and later can be used. More-
over, the model reduces the effort required by protocol designers to manually
check all possible conditions that may lead to undesirable behaviours.
In the future work, we consider scaling the evaluation of the DNP3-SA
over either a multi-drop or data concentrator architecture, which usually in-
volves multiple master stations communicating with many outstations. This
is to determine the impact of the flaw on large production systems. We
will use the current model as a framework to broaden the scope of our work
through parameterisation.
31
References
Amoah, R., Suriadi, S., Camtepe, S., Foo, E., 2014. Security analysis of
the non-aggressive challenge response of the DNP3 protocol using a CPN
model. In: Communications (ICC), 2014 IEEE International Conference
on. IEEE, pp. 827–833.
Ancillotti, E., Bruno, R., Conti, M., 2013. The role of communication systems
in smart grids: Architectures, technical solutions and research challenges.
Computer Communications 36 (17), 1665–1697.
Bodei, C., Buchholtz, M., Degano, P., Nielson, F., Nielson, H. R., 2005. Static
validation of security protocols. J. of Computer Security 13 (3), 347–390.
Bolignano, D., Le Me´tayer, D., Loiseaux, C., 2001. Formal methods in prac-
tice: The missing links. a perspective from the security area. In: Modeling
and verification of parallel processes. Springer, pp. 169–180.
Floreani, D., Billington, J., Dadej, A., 1996. Designing and verifying a com-
munications gateway using coloured Petri nets and design/CPN. Springer.
Gilchrist, G., 2008. Secure authentication for DNP3. In: IEEE Power and
Energy Society General Meeting-Conversion and Delivery of Electrical En-
ergy in the 21st Century, 2008. Pittsburg, PA, pp. 1–3.
Gungor, V. C., Sahin, D., Kocak, T., Ergut, S., Buccella, C., Cecati, C.,
Hancke, G. P., 2013. A survey on smart grid potential applications and
communication requirements. Industrial Informatics, IEEE Transactions
on 9 (1), 28–42.
Hall, A., 2007. Realising the benefits of formal methods. J. UCS 13 (5),
669–678.
IEEE, 2012. IEEE Standard for Electric Power Systems Communications-
Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3). IEEE Std 1815-2012, 1–866.
Jensen, K., Christensen, S., Kristensen, L. M., 2006. CPN tools state space
manual. University of Aarhus - Dpt. of Computer Science, Aarhus N, DK.
Jensen, K., Kristensen, L., Wells, L., 2007. Coloured Petri Nets and CPN
Tools for modelling and validation of concurrent systems. Intl. Journal on
Software Tools for Technology Transfer (STTT) 9 (3), 213–254.
32
Langner, R., 2011. Stuxnet: Dissecting a cyberwarfare weapon. Security &
Privacy, IEEE 9 (3), 49–51.
Lu, X., Wang, W., Ma, J., 2013. An empirical study of communication infras-
tructures towards the smart grid: Design, implementation, and evaluation.
Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on 4 (1), 170–183.
Miller, B., Rowe, D., 2012. A survey SCADA of and critical infrastructure
incidents. In: Proceedings of the 1st Annual conference on Research in
information technology. ACM, pp. 51–56.
Ngo, L., Boyd, C., Nieto, J. G., 2010. Automating computational proofs for
public-key-based key exchange. In: Proceedings of the 4th international
conference on Provable security. Springer-Verlag, pp. 53–69.
Nicholson, A., Webber, S., Dyer, S., Patel, T., Janicke, H., 2012. SCADA
security in the light of cyber-warfare. Computers & Security 31 (4), 418–
436.
Pass, R., 2011. Limits of provable security from standard assumptions. In:
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of com-
puting. ACM, pp. 109–118.
Pointcheval, D., 2005. Provable security for public key schemes. In: Contem-
porary cryptology. Springer, pp. 133–190.
Tretmans, J., 1999. Testing concurrent systems: A formal approach. In:
Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Concurrency Theory.
Springer-Verlag, pp. 46–65.
Tritilanunt, S., Boyd, C., Foo, E., Manuel, J., 2006. Using coloured petri
nets to simulate dos-resistant protocols. In: in Proc. 7th Workshop and
Tutorial on Practical Use of Coloured Petri Nets and the CPN. Citeseer.
Woodcock, J., Larsen, P. G., Bicarregui, J., Fitzgerald, J., 2009. Formal
methods: Practice and experience. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
41 (4), 19.
Yan, Y., Qian, Y., Sharif, H., Tipper, D., 2013. A survey on smart grid
communication infrastructures: Motivations, requirements and challenges.
Communications Surveys & Tutorials, IEEE 15 (1), 5–20.
33
Appendix A. Description of Relevant DNP3-SA CPN Model
This section of this paper presents the details of the CPN declarations for
the DNP3-SA CPN model to interested readers. Table A.7 presents detailed
of CPN declarations of the DNP3-SA CPN model.
Table A.7: CPN Declaration for DNP3-SA - PartA
Remarks Components CPN Declarations
Requests
FC
Val allrqfc = 1‘(“0x01”)@1++ 1‘(“0x02”)@2++ 1‘(“0x03”)@3;
Colset fcode = string timed; Var f:fcode
OH
Val alloh = 1‘(“g20v1”)@1++ 2‘(“g20v7”)@2; Colset oheader =
string timed; Var oh:oheader
CPN Request Colset Request = product fcode*oheader
CPN AGM Request Colset AGrequest = product Request*hmac
Responses
FC
Val allrspfc =1‘(“0x81”)++ 1‘(“0x83”); Colset fcode = string;
Var f:fcode
OH Colset oheader = string; Var oh:oheader
IIN Colset IIN = string; Var i:IIN
CPN Response Colset Response = product fcode * oheader * IIN
Dynamic
States
Eg: Master waiting
for response
Colset states = with Ready|WaitRq|WaitRsp|Authpass|Authfail|
Processing|Critical|Trigger|Terminate|SecInit;
Challenge
Data
MAC Algorithm
Val allalg = 1‘(“HMAC-SHA-256”);
Colset algorithm = string; Var alg:algorithm
Sequence Number Colset seq = int; Var sn:seq
CPN challenge Data
Colset chlgdata = product seq*algorithm*PseudoRand;
Var cd:chlgdata
HMAC
Tag
Session Key Colset seckey = int; Var sk:session
HMAC Algorithm Colset algorithm = string; Var alg:algorithm
Challenge Data
Colset chlgdata = product seq*algorithm*PseudoRand;
Var cd:chlgdata
User ID Val allid =1‘1; Colset useid = int; Var u:useid
FC Colset fcode = string; Var f:fcode
CPN MAC Tag
Colset mac = record ff:fcode*
cdc:chlgdata*uu:useid
CPN HMAC Tag
Colset hmac = product algorithm*session*mac;
Var Mmtag, omtag:hmac
Nonce Pseudo Random
fun PRandom(p:PsedudoRand)=let val(pp) in if p=3 then 1‘70
else if p=70 then 1‘100 else p =100 then 1‘153 else if p= 153
then 1‘1000 else if p= 1000 then 1‘10 else if p=10 then 1‘6364 else
empty end;
Parameters Adversary val Spoof=true
Verify
Tags
HMAC tags
fun verifytags (Mtag:hmac,Otag:hmac)= let val(taM)=Mtag val
(tagO)=Otag in if Mtag=Otag then 1‘Authpass else 1‘ Authfail end;
Functions
For
Response
Responses
FC & OH
fun Vresp(f:fcode,oh:oheader)= let val(ff)=f val(ohh) = oh in if
f>=“0x02” andalso oh=“g20v1” then 1‘(“10—01—10”) else if f>=
“0x02” andalso oh=“g20v7” then 1‘(“11—00—11”) else empty end;
Responses
IIN
fun OutIIN(f:fcode,oh:oheader)= let val(ff)=f val(ohh)= oh in if
f=“0x01” then 1‘(“00 IIN 1”) else if f >=“0x02” then 1‘(“01 IIN 2”)
else empty end;
Response
OH
fun Rresp(oh:oheader)= let val(ohh)=oh in if oh=“10-01-10” orelse
oh=“11-00-11” then 1‘(“gWritten”) else if oh=“11-11-11” orelse
oh=“00-11-11” then 1‘(“NewValue”) else empty end;
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Appendix B. Description of DNP-SA CPN Model Specification
This section presents all relevant third-level pages of the DNP3-SA CPN
model to interested readers. Figure B.13 depicts Tsub SendRequests from
the master station. It is the first step involved in the protocol. In this figure,
the master station can compose either a NACR or an AGM request, and
transmits it through the network to the outstation. Initial composition of re-
quests is through place; Ready, Function Codes, Object Headers and LPN.
These places have markings that form the initial state of DNP3-SA CPN
model (Bubbles of Figure B.13). The occurrences of the markings create a
token on place IniRequests, which has been assigned with a colour set Re-
quest. Request is a product of the data type fcode and oheader (representing
a DNP3 request, see Table A.7). Similarly, when the incoming arc of tran-
sition SendPack is satisfied, tokens are created and respectively distributed
to various output places. For example, the presence of a token on place
AGMRqsts indicates that the master station may transmit an AGM request
after completion of the NACR operation.
Figure B.14 depicts the third step of the specification; Tsub OutRecv Send.
From the left of the figure, the outstation receives NACR requests from the
master station through sendRq. The middle part of the figure depicts the
outstation receiving AGM requests from the master station. On the far-
right, the outstation receives HMAC tags from the master station. The
figure also presents that any time a request is received by the outstation, it
causes the outstation’s state to change from waiting for requests to process-
ing (i.e. WaitRq to Processing). Similarly, whenever the outstation receives
HMAC tags from the master station, we model a mechanism that triggers
the outstation to compute its HMAC tags (refer to Figure B.19 for details).
Figure B.15 depicts details of Tsub CHGenerator. It is the fourth process
Figure B.13: The master sending requests - Third-level page
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Figure B.14: Outstation sending/receiving messages - Third-level page.
involved in the specification. It presents the behaviour as to how the out-
station generates challenge messages. Transition Create Challenge Data is
enabled to create a challenge message whenever a token (request) is received
through place Critical Operate. In creating challenge messages, the tran-
sition uses following markings; HMACalg, PseudoR & Seqnum to create chal-
lenge data and later forwards it to transition OFCHI through place OCHD1
to be sent to network via place SendChlg1. The mentioned markings mark
the HMAC algorithm agreed between the stations, the nonce and CSQ (refer
to surroundings of transition Create Challenge Data in the figure). Places
RecentGH, NextCH1 and NextCH2 model recent challenge messages that can
be during the AGM operation. Tsub OSecureCH models a similar behaviour of
creating challenge messages. However, the behaviour is set to false because it
is not yet considered to be part of the DNP3-SA protocol. Table ?? presents
how we mimicked the behaviour of the nonce by defining the CPN function
PRandom. The function randomly generates a number each time a challenge
message is about to be issued. Additionally, in order to be consistent with
the MSC provided in Figure 1, we have defined certain expressions to the arcs
of place Seqnum between transition Create Challenge Data and Fward AGM
Challenge Data. This is to ensure that for every session, every challenge
message issued must have its CSQ updated by 1. Places RecentCH, NextCH1
and NextCH2 represent the recently issued challenge message for AGM. They
are activated only when their arc statements are valid (refer top-center of
the figure).
Figure B.16 presents details Tsub MasSecure (refer to Figure 4). It is a
SecondLevel page, that consists of three Tsub; NACRSec, AGMSec & ChalgAuth.
All transitions model the security behaviour of master station. The initial
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Figure B.15: Outstation generating challenge messages for the master station - Third-level
page.
Figure B.16: Second-level of the master station security mechanism - Third-level page.
behaviour of the protocol deals first with NACRSec, before AGMSec. Tsub Chal-
gAuth runs in parallel with Tsub OSecureCH, which is not part of the normal
behaviour of the protocol. Therefore, we set it to false.
In Figure B.17 (fifth step), the master station receives challenge messages
from the outstation through place sendchlg1 (Lower-left of Figure B.16 &
B.17). From the challenge data, the CSQ data is extracted and updated on
place MPrvSeq, whiles place Algo extracts the HMAC algorithm (refer to sur-
roundings of SecureNACR). Then, place Chdata sends a copy of the challenge
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Figure B.17: Details of NACR security mechanism - Third-level page.
message to transition SecureNACR in order to compute a NACR HMAC tag.
When all incoming arcs to the transition are genuinely satisfied, SecureNACR
computes the HMAC tag and transmits it via the network through place
SendARes to the outstation. The right-hand side of the figure depicts up-
dates of CSQ in challenge messages for AGM operations (i.e. in case the
master wishes to transmits aggressive requests). It is to be noted that this
behaviour only becomes active after a successful completion of NACR opera-
tion. This is achieved through the CPN function NextSeq, NextSeq & NewSeq
(refer to Table A.7 for the declaration). As previously emphasised, updating
CSQ is considered to be the “most recently received challenge message” from
the outstation (according to specification of the protocol). This leads us to
Tsub AGMSec; depicted in Figure B.18.
In the AGM mode (Figure B.18), place AGMRqsts marks initial requests
that the master station wishes to execute on the outstation (top of the figure).
Place RecentCHM (Lower-left of the figure) marks the most recent challenge
message (i.e. updated CSQ). Computation of HMAC tags in AGM is similar
to NACR computation, that is, when all incoming arcs (bindings) of transi-
tion SecureAGM get satisfied, the transition is enabled to compute an AGM
HMAC tag based on the request. Then, transition AGMPack assembles the
initial request together with the HMAC tag calculated and transmits it to
the network through place SendAGMRq (middle, far-right of the figure).
Figure B.19 depicts details of the sixth step of the specification; Tsub
OutSecure (refer to Figure 4). In this figure, the outstation can either com-
pute a NACR or AGM HMAC tag; depending on which request has to be
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Figure B.18: Details of AGM security mechanism - Third-level page.
processed. By default, every HMAC tag received by the outstation is held in
place StoreHMAC until the outstation computes its tag and verifies the tags
to authenticate the master station (see left-top of Figure B.19). Both tran-
sition SecureO NACR and SecureO AGM in this figure use the same method
employed by the master to compute their HMAC tag (i.e. when all their re-
spective bindings are satisfied). Any HMAC tag computed by the outstation
is held in place OHMAC for verification. This eventually enables transition
Tagcheck to verify both tags for equality. We defined and use the CPN
function Verifytags(Mtag,Otag) to perform the verification process (Refer to
Table A.7 for the declaration). During the verification process, irrespective
of the authentication status, a message is generated for the master station
through Tsub OProcess (where actual operations are carried out). This leads
us to Figure B.20 (i.e. Tsub OProcess).
Figure B.20 presents details of the seventh step in Figure 4; Tsub OProcess.
The figure presents the details of the outstation processing requests and gen-
erating responses for the master station; depending on the authentication
status. Place AuthStatus models the authentication status after the verifi-
cation of tags from the outstation security mechanism (refer to top of this
figure and lower-left of Figure B.19). Tsub AuthErr on the figure (Figure B.20)
marks the outstation generating error messages as responses for the master
station. This always occurs when authentication fails (unmatched HMAC
tags). On the other hand, the label part ‘Process legitimate requests’
indicates the outstation processing every requests after a successful authen-
tication. From AuthStatus, a pass in authentication (i.e. Authpass) enables
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Figure B.19: Details of the outstation security mechanism - Third-level page.
transition Perform Critical to send authenticated requests for processing.
The authenticated request may instruct the outstation to perform certain
actions such as deleting a configuration or reading or even writing a cur-
rent value to the various IEDs. In doing so, the outstation also generates
a standard response for the master station. On the other hand, if authen-
tication fails (i.e. Authfail), requests are rather sent to Tsub AuthErr to
generate authentication failure messages and send them as responses to the
master station. SendRsp models the output of messages (responses) from Tsub
OProcess to the master station via the network (Lower-left of the figure).
Figure B.20: Details of the outstation processing requests received - Third-level page.
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